


CONNECTING GLASGOW


- PHASE 2:
Reshaping our strategic
road and rail networks



GLASGOW'S STRATEGIC TRANSPORT CHALLENGE



The “real” size of Birmingham, measured by 30m journey to city centre




**At peak time
(8am - 9am)
0.9m people**


**Off peak
(6am-7am)
1.3m people**

**Simulated tram
(all day)
1.7m people**


GLASGOW'S STRATEGIC TRANSPORT CHALLENGE



••○ The South Clyde Growth Corridor



••○ Glasgow Central Metro – potential routes





••○ Glasgow Metro at Queen Elizabeth University Hospital (visualisation)





--○ Glasgow metro on Edinburgh Road (visualisation)



Metro in Glasgow Airport (visualisation) ○●








Figures for rail passenger growth at Glasgow Central



PASSENGER NUMBERS



Stockholm City Rail Tunnel



Glasgow Central/Queen Street tunnel





THE STRATEGIC ROAD NETWORK



Kingston Bridge at peak

Daily Journey Time Profile for Westbound Traffic between Junction 22 and 29





This mix of roles and responsibilities makes it challenging to integrate transport provision or take a holistic view of how the transport network functions and supports wider socio-economic aims. Unlike in England, the move towards City Deal funding has not materially addressed these regional governance issues, resulting in a fragmented list of (mostly roads) projects subdivided to meet local political demands and lacking cohesion. This is not an optimal system of governance to deliver the step-change in connectivity we call for in this report.

The key question relevant in the context of this report and our ambitions to transform transport in Glasgow is how we need to organise to plan and actually deliver significant projects that will bring benefits at local, regional and national scales. Given Transport Scotland's expertise and track record in delivering major transport infrastructure projects successfully, there is a clear role for it to play in projects of similar scope and complexity within the city region, especially given that we need to move to delivery of our recommendations as quickly as possible. But to do so will require a redefinition of its focus and a fresh negotiation of how it interacts with regional government and key stakeholders.

Lastly, there is a need to identify and encourage private-sector investment, and in particular to ensure that the land around key transport nodes is made as productive as possible, coordinating individual developments so that they support the strategic redevelopment of Glasgow city centre in particular. Experience of other cities impacted by HS2 has demonstrated that planning for new station capacity can have a strong impact on improving land value and act as a catalyst for private sector investment. Whilst the recommendations outlined in this report will require a significant amount of public funding, it is unrealistic to expect the public purse to shoulder their entire cost. There is a clear opportunity, particularly given the relatively large amount of derelict and under-utilised land in Glasgow, to utilise the land value uplift to finance some of the infrastructure expenditure identified by the Commission.